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Abstract: Several social structures deeply affect the equality of people with disabilities, but are 
not ordinarily considered when addressing attitudinal and environmental barriers that 
disadvantage disabled people. These structures, which relate to employment and the law that 
regulates it, are: (1) the legal doctrine of employment at will as opposed to notice or severance 
payment in lieu of notice; (2) unionization or its absence; and (3) government-sponsored social 
insurance programs. These structures differ from country to country, even between nations with 
a similar legal heritage. Drawing comparisons between Canada and the United States with regard 
to each social structure, this paper describes these arrangements and their impact, then discusses 
how their reform could enhance equality for people with disabilities. 
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Social structures affect opportunities for disabled persons to participate in society as 
equals. Social structures are the stable systems by which people or groups relate to each other 
(Bell, 1965, p. 208). Social structures such as the way buildings and streets are constructed, job 
qualification standards, educational opportunities, medical care systems, and popular culture 
either engage or marginalize disabled persons (Hahn, 1993). Some of these, notably building 
standards, public transportation systems, and education, have long been recognized as 
disadvantaging people with disabilities, and activists have targeted them for change (Berg, 1999, 
pp. 9-10). Activists were working to alter physical and attitudinal barriers in these areas long 
before the social model of disability emerged and put a name to the approach they were taking 
(tenBroek, 1966, p. 842).  
 
But other social structures also have a significant effect on equality for people with 
disabilities.  These may be referred to as “background social structures.” They form a 
background against which other arrangements and practices operate, but their effects on the 
equality of disabled persons may be less apparent than those of staircases, inaccessible buses, 
and one-size-fits-all education. 
 
 Employment is an area in which background structures have a weighty impact on 
disabled persons. A study of several employment-related social arrangements and how they 
differ in the U.S. and Canada may provide insight about the prospects for equality for disabled 
persons in both countries. Drawing Canadian and American comparisons, this paper describes 
three such structures and discusses how their reform may be possible and could enhance equality 
for people with disabilities. Each social structure discussed here has a major legal dimension. 
This paper adopts an intermediate level of generality in its discussion, focusing neither on 
technical differences in interpretation of specific Canadian and U.S. disability discrimination 
statutes (Weber, 2010, p. 1171) nor on broad generalizations (Lipset, 1990, p. 2) about 
comparative Canadian and American culture. 
 
Background Social Structures Related to Employment and the Law 
 
 Consider three background structures concerning employment and its legal regulation for 
which the United States-Canadian comparison may be useful: (1) the legal doctrine of 
employment at-will as opposed to notice or severance pay in lieu of notice; (2) unionization or its 
absence; and (3) government-sponsored social insurance. 
 
At-Will Employment Versus Notice or Severance Payment in Lieu of Notice 
 
 The dominant legal structure for employment in the United States is employment at will, 
which applies generally to private employees, except those who are unionized and those in 
Montana (Arnow-Richman, 2010, p. 4). The employer may discharge the worker for any reason 
or for none at all, as long as the reason is not one forbidden by discrimination laws or other 
public policy (American Law Institute, 2009, § 2.01). Although Canadian law does not require 
that discharge be for cause, the law says that for any termination without cause, the employee 
must be provided either adequate notice or a salary payment as severance in lieu of notice (Bird 
& Charters, 2004, p. 205). The requirement of providing notice or severance creates a 
disincentive to discharge, in effect saying “you can fire the employee, but it will cost you.” 
Conversely, an incentive is created to provide accommodations or other means to make workers 
more successful and keep them employed. Moreover, in the United States a discharge without 
cause is sufficiently common to trigger no special scrutiny and thus provides a good shield for 
hidden discrimination (McGinley, 1996, p. 1462). The notice-or-severance policy makes it a 
rarer event in Canada. In fact, many Canadians incorrectly believe they cannot legally be 
discharged absent just cause (Bird & Charters, 2004, pp. 242-43).  
 
 However, the risk of a costs award that will including significant attorneys’ fees against a 
litigant who is unsuccessful (Knutsen, 2010) may deter Canadian workers from taking notice-
severance claims to court, even when they have the law on their side. In addition, American 
litigiousness (Lipset, 1990, p. 100) may equalize the likelihood of American and Canadian 
challenges to discharge to some degree. 
 
Unionization or Its Absence 
 
 Unionization is much more prevalent in Canada than in the United States, especially in 
the public sector, where Canadian union density is 78%, in contrast to the American number of 
36% (Finlayson, 2007). The Canadian legal framework for unions is widely viewed as more 
supportive than the American one (Titkemeyer, 2006). Canada regards collective bargaining as a 
fundamental right. The Canadian Supreme Court has applied the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms to overturn legislation applicable to public sector bargaining that had suspended union 
agreements, restricted contract terms, and limited the scope of bargaining (Health Servs. & 
Support Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. B.C., 2007). In contrast, a leading American 
court decision upheld the federal government’s refusal to negotiate with a public workers’ union 
about a program of performance incentives, finding the subject non-negotiable under applicable 
law (Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 1986). 
 
 Unionization helps workers who have disabilities. As Malhotra (2009, p. 103) has 
written, the presence of a union opens up arbitration as a way to enforce accommodation rights, 
and as Lynk (2008, p. 224-226) demonstrated, Canadian labor arbitration is more effective than 
are human rights tribunals or courts in enforcing disability accommodations and obtaining 
reinstatement for workers when appropriate. Taking a disability discrimination complaint to 
arbitration with union support is likely to be far less onerous for the employee than the 
widespread American practice of finding an attorney—which may be difficult given the poor 
record of success in litigation (Stein, Waterstone, & Wilkins, 2010, p. 1689)—and bringing a 
case to the federal courts.  
 
 It is true, as Malhotra (2003, p. 144-147) also indicates, that union-protected rights, such 
as seniority and the integrity of bargaining units, may conflict with accommodations such as 
transferring to other positions when an employee no longer can perform the functions of an 
existing job even with workplace modifications. Malhotra points out that under Canadian law, a 
tribunal may consider potential conflict with a union contract when evaluating an employer’s 
refusal to provide accommodations (2003, p. 148). Moreover, the individual-focused interactive 
process of working out accommodations with the employer may conflict with collective 
bargaining practices. Nevertheless, both collective bargaining and seniority practices can be 
reconciled with accommodation rights if the employer and bargaining unit representative act in 
good faith (Bruyere, 1993, pp. 123-24). 
 
 On a more basic level, however, Canada’s union-friendliness indicates a greater 
willingness to allow outsiders—both unions and courts—to intervene in the control of the 
workplace in Canada than in the United States. There is a strong management-prerogative 
ideology in the United States, and management prerogative is often relied on explicitly in 
judicial decisions in American discrimination cases. For example, in Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), the United States Supreme Court said of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, “The statute was not intended to diminish traditional management 
prerogatives” (p. 259). This American attitude of deference to the employer reinforces the 
reluctance of American judges to require employers to provide accommodations to disabled 
workers (O’Brien, 2001, pp. 3-4).  
 
Social Insurance Programs 
 
 In both countries social insurance benefits are available for individuals who meet a 
disability threshold. These benefits programs are exemplified by the Canadian Pension Plan, the 
Quebec Pension Plan (CPP/QPP), and U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Both the 
Canadian and United States programs are relative newcomers to the social insurance structures in 
the two countries. The CPP/QPP disability program came into being in 1968 and started making 
payments in 1970 (Campolieti & Krashinsky, 2002, p. 419). SSDI came into being in 1956; a 
requirement that beneficiaries be 50 or older was repealed in 1960 (Weber, 2009, p. 583). The 
Canadian and American programs provide benefits to individuals who meet a standard of long-
term and severe disability. Within limits, the level of benefits depends on the level of earnings 
before the onset of disability. However, the benefits are distributed in such a way that low 
earners receive a greater proportional amount in relation to prior income than higher earners.  
 
 Benefits under these programs are tied to having a record of work. Only chancier and 
more meager social safety net programs cover those who lack a long work history (Wiseman & 
Ycas, 2008). There is thus a premium on getting and keeping work, even apart from wages and 
whatever social connection and personal fulfillment a job may provide. The weakness of 
American government programs for impoverished people who lack a work history makes the 
problems of lack of social insurance coverage even more acutely felt below the 49th parallel than 
in Canada (Wiseman & Ycas, 2008, p. 61).  
 
To the extent that work is unavailable for people who have disabilities in the United 
States and Canada, the result is severe income inequality uncushioned by public pensions. In the 
United States, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) may provide subsistence for people with 
disabling conditions, but its benefits are set at sub-poverty level: an amount about 70% of the 
federal poverty level. On the other hand, for workers who become disabled after an extensive 
employment history, social insurance payments offer a lifestyle that has some level of dignity 
(Weber, 2009, p. 603).The lack of work for people with disabilities in the United States and 
Canada results in severe income inequality uncushioned by public pensions. On the other hand, 
for workers who become disabled after an extensive employment history, social insurance 
payments offer a lifestyle that has some level of dignity (Weber, 2009, p. 603). 
 
Reforming Background Social Structures 
 
 It is possible to undertake reforms to make these background social structures offer better 
opportunities for equality for disabled persons, and circumstances suggest that expending effort 
and resources on these reforms is worthwhile. 
  
 At-will employment is longstanding part of U.S. common law, one that has been 
challenged repeatedly with few successes (Feinman, 1976, pp. 118, 128-29). It is a bad sign for 
the challengers that the recent American Law Institute Restatement of Employment Law 
enshrines the principle (American Law Institute, 2009, §2.01). Permitting discharge only for 
cause would be a better rule than the Canadian rule of severance-in-lieu-of-notice for employees 
who are vulnerable to hidden discrimination, but notice-severance is surely better for disabled 
workers than at-will. Recent American legal scholarship supports the adoption of a legal 
requirement of advance notice before discharge (Arnow-Richman, 2010), and the WARN Act, 
requiring notice before mass layoffs, is an example of a limited U.S. reform along these lines 
(Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act, 2006), so there may be a basis for 
optimism that the United States position might be nudged a little closer to Canada’s through 
legislation or law reform litigation. 
 
 As for unionization, it would appear to be strongly in the interest of people with 
disabilities and allies to support unionization and laws that facilitate unionization, if only to 
weaken the ideology that management has an ironclad entitlement to make all of the decisions at 
the workplace, including those about accommodations. Moreover, as long as the union provides 
assistance, the arbitral forum is a good one for disabled workers. Malhotra (2009, pp. 101-102) 
has pointed out that non-unionized workers fare poorly in Canada in comparison to unionized 
workers with regard to accommodations. Perhaps the famous litigiousness of U.S. culture has 
some effect on promoting the disability accommodation rights of individual workers who lack 
the support of a union. But on the whole it would seem in the interests of disabled people and 
their allies in both Canada and the United States to advocate for greater union power. At the 
same time, efforts to facilitate individual disability discrimination litigation by nonunionized 
Canadian workers may be in order. 
 
 On balance, social insurance programs benefit people with disabilities, so measures to 
strengthen them would appear desirable. Social insurance is a work incentive, and part of the 
overall rewards that come from work (Berkowitz, 2005, p. 23). It not only protects against the 
obvious economic risks that come with illness, accident, and age, but also provides some 
financial protection against the risk of disability discrimination. If after a person is disabled, no 
one will hire the individual even when he or she could work with accommodations, disability 
insurance furnishes a means of survival, typically at levels a good deal higher than the 
subsistence that may be available under poverty programs (Weber, 2009, p. 591).  
 
 Social insurance benefits are both generous compared to other forms of government 
support and relatively unlikely to be cut back in hard times because of the sense of entitlement 
created by funding through a dedicated payroll tax (Berkowitz, 2005, p. 23). Social insurance has 
been crucial in lifting the elderly out of poverty in the United States and Canada (Wiseman & 
Ycas, 2008). Nevertheless, social insurance alone is inadequate. Many individuals with 
disabilities lack the work history needed for social insurance eligibility (Erkulwater, 2006, p. 82) 
and continue to face poor or no employment options under current accommodation practices 
(Stein & Stein, 2007, p. 1210-1211). Public welfare programs will have to meet their needs 
(Erkulwater, 2006, p. 242). Proposals to bolster public welfare programs may meet resistance in 
the current political climate in North America, but people with disabilities and their allies should 
make the case for maintenance and expansion of social insurance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Background structures such as the nature of the employment contract, unionization, and 
social insurance arrangements, exert influence on the equal participation of people with 
disabilities in society. Reforms of these structures to promote equality appear both feasible and 
desirable.  
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